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DUTY OR NO DUTY? THAT IS THE 
QUESTION: THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
REASSERTS THAT A VIOLATION OF ITEM 
303’S DUTY TO DISCLOSE CAN ESTABLISH 
LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 10(B) 
Abstract: On March 29, 2016, in Indiana Public Retirement Systems v. SAIC, 
Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reaffirmed its ear-
lier conclusion that a violation of the duty to disclose imposed on publicly traded 
companies by Item 303 of Regulation S-K can constitute a violation of Section 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. In so doing, the Second Circuit di-
rectly conflicted with a decision from the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit, Cohen v. NVIDIA Corp. (In re NVIDIA Corp. Securities Litiga-
tion), despite the fact that both courts relied upon the Third Circuit’s Oran v. Staf-
ford opinion in reaching their decisions. This Comment argues that a violation of 
Item 303 can constitute a violation of Section 10(b), and, further, that the Second 
Circuit adopted the correct approach because it faithfully construed the underly-
ing regulation and statute, correctly followed earlier jurisprudence, and furthered, 
not frustrated, the principal goals of the federal securities laws. 
INTRODUCTION 
The dual goals of the federal securities laws are to regulate securities ex-
changes and to protect investors from abusive practices.1 To effectuate those 
goals, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has implemented a rig-
orous disclosure scheme.2 To that end, Rule 10b-5, promulgated under Section 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), makes it unlaw-
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, 571 U.S. 377, 390 (2014) (noting that the federal secu-
rities laws seek to safeguard the exchanges and protect investors); Crofoot v. Sperry Rand Corp., 408 
F. Supp. 1154, 1156 (E.D. Cal. 1976) (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 
(1975)) (“The 1934 Act thus has the dual purpose of providing for the regulation of the securities and 
over-the-counter market and protecting the investor from inequitable and unfair practices . . . .”). The 
two principal vehicles of federal securities regulation are the Securities Act of 1933, which governs 
the initial public offering of securities, and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which governs all 
facets of public securities transactions. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES REGULA-
TION 16–17 (4th ed. rev. 2017). 
 2 Matthew C. Turk & Karen E. Woody, The Leidos Mixup and the Misunderstood Duty to Dis-
close in Securities Law, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 957, 968–69 (2018) (“The main tool used to reach 
[the goals of the federal securities laws] is the mandatory disclosure regime. The Securities Act of 
1933 . . . and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . [and] the attendant rules and regulations issued by 
the SEC, establish an elaborate regulatory framework based on this premise.”). 
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ful to omit or misstate any material fact.3 Similarly, Item 303 of Regulation S-
K (Item 303), requires select SEC-mandated reports to disclose trends or un-
certainties of which the reporting company is aware, and which the company 
expects will adversely affect its economic outlook.4 
In Cohen v. NVIDIA Corp. (In re NVIDIA Corp. Securities Litigation), the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a violation of the 
duty to disclose imposed by Item 303 does not establish liability under Section 
10(b).5 By contrast, in Indiana Public Retirement Systems v. SAIC, Inc., the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, building upon its earlier 
decision in Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, recognized that a violation of 
Item 303’s duty to disclose can constitute a violation of Section 10(b).6 Though 
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in SAIC, a settlement one 
day prior to oral argument precluded resolution of the circuit split.7 Thus, the 
split leaves lower courts, securities law practitioners, and corporate filers un-
                                                                                                                           
 3 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 
(2018). Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, the broad anti-fraud provision of the federal securities laws, 
makes it illegal for “any person, directly or indirectly . . . [t]o use or employ, in connection with the pur-
chase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of 
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe . . . .” § 10(b). Rule 10-b5, promulgated 
thereunder, in pertinent part, makes it unlawful to “make any untrue statement of a material fact or to 
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading.” § 240.10b-5. 
 4 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii) (2018) (requiring corporate filers to “[d]escribe any known trends 
or uncertainties that have had or that the registrant reasonably expects will have a material favorable 
or unfavorable impact on net sales or revenues or income from continuing operations”); see Manage-
ment’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations; Certain Investment 
Company Disclosures, Exchange Act Release No. 33-6835, 54 Fed. Reg. 22,427 (May 18, 1989) 
[hereinafter Certain Investment Company Disclosures] (clarifying, in an interpretative release, the 
parameters of the disclosure obligation mandated by Item 303). Regulation S-K is a scheme of inte-
grated disclosure enacted by the SEC to eliminate redundancy in an issuer’s filing obligations under 
the Exchange Act and the Securities Act of 1933. 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.10–.1208 (2018); Turk & Woody, 
supra note 2, at 972. Regulation S-K requires disclosure covering numerous substantive areas of the 
reporting company’s business, such as corporate governance and any pending litigation. Turk & 
Woody, supra note 2, at 972 n.69 (citing 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.10–.1208). 
 5 Cohen v. NVIDIA Corp. (In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig.), 768 F.3d 1046, 1056 (9th Cir. 
2014). 
 6 Compare Ind. Pub. Ret. Sys. v. SAIC, Inc., 818 F.3d 85, 94 n.7 (2d Cir. 2016) (reaffirming its 
position that Item 303 creates an affirmative duty to disclose, violation of which can establish a claim 
under Section 10(b)), and Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 101 (2d Cir. 2015) (con-
cluding that a violation of Item 303’s affirmative duty to disclose can constitute a violation of Section 
10(b)), with In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d at 1056 (holding that a violation of Item 303’s 
duty to disclose does not establish a violation of Section 10(b)). 
 7 Turk & Woody, supra note 2, at 960 (noting that the Supreme Court was unable to resolve the 
doctrinal issues in SAIC because of a last-minute settlement). The Supreme Court formally dismissed 
the writ of certiorari in June 2018 pursuant to a joint petition by the parties. Stipulation to Dismiss the 
Writ of Certiorari at 1, Leidos, Inc. v. Ind. Pub. Ret. Sys., 137 S. Ct. 1395 (2017) (No. 16-581). 
2019] Section 10(b) Liability for Violations of Item 303’s Duty to Disclose II.-49 
certain of whether a violation of Item 303’s duty to disclose can serve as the 
basis for a Section 10(b) violation.8 
Part I of this Comment describes the facts of SAIC that led to the lawsuit, 
the Second Circuit’s disposition of the case, and provides an overview of the 
disclosure obligations mandated by the federal securities laws.9 Part II examines 
the different positions the circuits have taken on the issue of whether a violation 
of Item 303’s duty to disclose can serve as a basis for liability under Section 
10(b).10 Part III analyzes the Second Circuit’s decision in SAIC and concludes it 
is more persuasive than the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning and outcome.11 
I. THE FACTS AND HISTORY OF SAIC AND THE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS 
OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS 
Section A of this Part discusses the factual background of the Second Cir-
cuit’s SAIC.12 Section B details the procedural history of SAIC.13 Section C 
provides an overview of the disclosure obligations required by the federal se-
curities laws.14 
A. SAIC’s Factual History 
In 2000, New York City retained SAIC, Inc. (SAIC) as the primary contrac-
tor on a government project to create and deploy CityTime, an automated time-
keeping program.15 In 2002, SAIC retained Gerard Denault to serve as the City-
Time project’s Deputy Program Manager.16 Denault in turn retained Technodyne 
to fulfill the project’s staffing needs.17 The partnership quickly deteriorated into 
a kickback scheme wherein Technodyne unlawfully paid Denault for each hour a 
Technodyne affiliate performed work on the CityTime project.18 The arrange-
ment incentivized Denault both to employ more Technodyne workers than nec-
                                                                                                                           
 8 See Turk & Woody, supra note 2, at 960 (noting that the uncertainty created by this split will 
remain indeterminately). 
 9 See infra notes 12–58 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 59–85 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 86–108 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 15–30 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 31–41 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 42–58 and accompanying text. 
 15 SAIC, 818 F.3d at 89. SAIC, now known as Leidos Holdings, Inc., provided its customers, 
predominantly government agencies, with defense-related services. Id. SAIC developed CityTime for 
use by numerous New York City agencies. Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. As part of that arrangement, Technodyne also illegally paid SAIC’s Chief Systems Engineer, 
Carl Bell. Id. SAIC ultimately billed New York City approximately $635 million for CityTime, far ex-
ceeding the project’s initial cost estimate of $63 million. Id. The $635 million included costs from the 
kickback arrangement as well as those stemming from a contract amendment that made New York 
City liable for any cost overruns. Id. 
II.-50 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:E. Supp. 
essary and to exaggerate the number of hours required to complete the CityTime 
project.19 
In late 2010, when SAIC caught on to the scheme, it put Denault on ad-
ministrative leave and hired a law firm to investigate potential fraud in con-
junction with SAIC’s audit team.20 On March 9, 2011, the audit team reported 
the results of its investigation to SAIC.21 Despite the audit team’s findings of 
impropriety, SAIC did not disclose any possible liability stemming from the 
CityTime project in its Annual Report on Form 10-K, filed on March 25, 
2011.22 SAIC only disclosed the existence of the criminal investigations in fil-
ings with the SEC after authorities filed federal criminal charges against 
Denault and others involved with CityTime.23 In May 2011, SAIC fired 
Denault, and offered to repay $2.5 million to New York City.24 
On June 2, 2011, in a Current Report on Form 8-K, SAIC reported that 
government authorities were performing a criminal investigation into City-
Time.25 The 8-K further disclosed that there was potential further exposure, 
which was incapable of estimation at that time, should the investigation con-
                                                                                                                           
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. Around this time, then-Mayor Michael Bloomberg, announced that New York City was 
considering whether to attempt to reclaim the funds paid out for the project. Id. 
 21 Id. at 89. The results included information regarding the inappropriate timekeeping methods 
Denault utilized for the CityTime project. Id. 
 22 Id. Pursuant to the disclosure obligations imposed by the federal securities laws, domestic 
companies registered with the SEC must file an annual report on Form 10-K, which offers “a compre-
hensive overview of the company’s business and financial condition and includes audited financial 
statements.” Fast Answers: Form 10-K, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (June 26, 2009), https://www.
sec.gov/fast-answers/answers-form10khtm.html [https://perma.cc/6DF3-VLLX]. Similarly, public 
companies must also file reports on Form 10-Q “for each of the first three fiscal quarters of the com-
pany’s fiscal year.” Fast Answers: Form 10-Q, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Sept. 2, 2011), 
https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersform10qhtm.html [https://perma.cc/UDK9-UR4R]. Forms 
10-Q must include “unaudited financial statements and provid[e] a continuing view of the company’s 
financial position during the year.” Id. Finally, public companies are also required to report certain 
material events on a regular basis. Fast Answers: Form 8-K, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Aug. 10, 
2012), https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersform8khtm.html [https://perma.cc/H4UW-8SG8]. 
The Current Report on Form 8-K is filed with the SEC “to announce major events that shareholders 
should know about.” Id.; see also Jennifer S. Fan, Regulating Unicorns: Disclosure and the New Pri-
vate Economy, 57 B.C. L. REV. 583, 606 (2016) (detailing the principal filing requirements imposed 
on public companies). In SAIC, Walter P. Havenstein, SAIC’s Chief Executive Officer and Mark W. 
Sopp, SAIC’s Chief Financial Officer, certified the 10-K’s accuracy in its filing with the SEC. 818 
F.3d at 89. Moreover, in an independent Annual Report to investors, SAIC publicized its “commit-
ment to high standards of ‘ethical performance and integrity,’” despite the fact that, by May 2011, 
many connected with the CityTime project were named in a federal criminal complaint alleging fraud. 
Id. (quoting Joint Appendix at 252, SAIC, 818 F.3d 85 (No. 14-4140-cv)). 
 23 See SAIC, 818 F.3d at 89–90 (noting that SAIC finally informed the SEC and investors about 
the criminal investigation in a Form 8-K). 
 24 Id. The $2.5 million represented what Denault billed New York City as part of the fraudulent 
kickback scheme. Id. at 90. 
 25 Id.; SAIC, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (June 2, 2011). 
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clude negatively.26 SAIC’s Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q, filed on June 3, 
2011, parroted those statements.27 In a second 8-K, filed with the SEC on July 
1, 2011, SAIC included a letter from then-Mayor Michael Bloomberg request-
ing that SAIC to reimburse New York City for approximately $600 million.28 
In March 2012, SAIC executed a deferred prosecution agreement with the fed-
eral government and New York City.29 Pursuant to the terms of that agreement, 
SAIC agreed to cooperate in the pending investigation, to give up its claim for 
the $40 million in amounts New York City still owed, and to repay approxi-
mately $500.4 million.30 
B. SAIC’s Procedural History 
The plaintiffs, investors in SAIC, sued SAIC under Sections 10(b) and 
20(a) of the Exchange Act.31 The plaintiffs alleged that SAIC’s SEC filings 
failed to disclose the company’s possible exposure stemming from the City-
Time project’s fraudulent conduct or any related known trends or uncertainties, 
as required by Item 303 and Financial Accounting Standard No. 5 (“FAS 5”).32 
                                                                                                                           
 26 SAIC, 818 F.3d at 89–90; SAIC, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (June 2, 2011). In that Form 
8-K, SAIC reported that the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York 
and the New York City Department of Investigation were jointly investigating the CityTime project. 
SAIC, 818 F.3d at 90. The Form 8-K further reported that SAIC invoiced $635 million for work on 
CityTime, that $40 million in receivables were outstanding, that Denault had been arrested, and that 
SAIC had offered to reimburse $2.5 million to the City. Id. Regarding possible further exposure, the 
Form 8-K stated, “there is a reasonable possibility of additional exposure to loss that is not currently 
estimable if there is an adverse outcome. An adverse outcome . . . could have a material adverse effect on 
the Company’s consolidated financial position, results of operations and cash flows.” SAIC, Inc., Exhibit 
99.2 to Current Report (Form 8-K) (June 2, 2011). Therefore, the 8-K asserted that a negative resolu-
tion of the investigation would negatively impact SAIC’s financial outlook. Id. In addition to filing the 
Form 8-K with the SEC, SAIC held a conference call with investors, during which SAIC leadership 
cited the Form 8-K as providing comprehensive information about the CityTime project and investiga-
tion. SAIC, 818 F.3d at 90. 
 27 SAIC, 818 F.3d at 90. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. In addition, SAIC acceded to distribute a “Statement of Responsibility,” in which it would 
admit to defrauding the City. Id. 
 31 Id. at 88; see Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 10(b), 20(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78t(a) 
(2012). Section 10(b) is the Exchange Act’s antifraud provision and Section 20(a) is the joint and 
several liability provision. §§ 10(b), 20(a). The plaintiffs also named SAIC’s Chief Executive Officer 
and Chief Financial Officer as defendants, among others. SAIC, 818 F.3d at 88. 
 32 SAIC, 818 F.3d at 91 (detailing the plaintiffs’ claim that SAIC’s March and June 2011 filings 
on Forms 10-K, 10-Q, and 8-K violated the disclosure requirements of FAS 5 and Item 303). Item 303 
imposes particular disclosure obligations on companies filing Forms 10-K and 10-Q. 17 C.F.R. 
§ 229.303(a)(3)(ii) (2018). FAS 5 establishes a framework for loss contingencies, requiring “the issuer 
to disclose a loss contingency when a loss is a ‘reasonable possibility,’ meaning that it is ‘more than 
remote but less than likely.’” SAIC, 818 F.3d at 93 (quoting Financial Accounting Standards Board, 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 5, Accounting for Contingencies ¶¶ 3, 10 (1975)). 
The plaintiffs also alleged that SAIC’s March 25, 2011 Form 10-K and the company’s independent 
II.-52 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:E. Supp. 
The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss for all of the 
claims except the allegations of FAS 5 and Item 303 violations relating to the 
March, 2011 Form 10-K.33 SAIC then filed a motion to reconsider the decision 
not to dismiss the FAS 5 and Item 303 claims, which the district court granted, 
dismissing the claims with prejudice.34 The plaintiffs then moved to vacate or 
obtain relief from the judgment.35 The plaintiffs also filed a motion for leave to 
file a proposed amended complaint.36 The district court denied the plaintiffs’ 
motions.37 The plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit, which vacated the judgment of the district court dismissing the 
FAS 5 and Item 303 claims.38 The defendants then petitioned for writ of certio-
rari to the United States Supreme Court, which the Court granted.39 The ques-
tion presented was whether the Second Circuit incorrectly held that Item 303 
creates a duty to disclose that, if violated, can establish liability under Section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5.40 On the eve of the Supreme Court’s hearing, the parties 
settled, precluding the Court from addressing the issue.41 
C. The Disclosure Requirements Mandated by the Federal Securities Laws 
To effectuate the dual aims of the federal securities laws, Section 10(b) of 
the Exchange Act makes it unlawful to use any manipulative device, in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of a security, in violation of the rules and 
                                                                                                                           
Annual Report both contained misrepresentations and misstatements about SAIC’s internal controls, 
its dedication to ethics, and its possible exposure due to the CityTime project. SAIC, 818 F.3d at 91. 
 33 SAIC, 818 F.3d at 91. The District Court granted the plaintiffs leave to amend, within forty-five 
days, some of the dismissed claims, but the plaintiffs opted to forgo repleading them. Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, “[a] motion to alter or amend a 
judgment must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.” FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e). 
Rule 60(b) states that “[on] motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representa-
tive from a final judgment, order, or proceeding . . . .” FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b). 
 36 SAIC, 818 F.3d at 91. Rule 15(a) governs the timing of the amendment of pleadings before 
trial. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a). 
 37 SAIC, 818 F.3d at 92. In denying Plaintiffs’ motions, the district court concluded that amending 
the proposed second amended complaint would be fruitless. Id. 
 38 Id. at 98. In vacating the judgment, the Second Circuit implicitly recognized that the violation 
of the duty to disclose imposed by Item 303 can constitute a violation of Section 10(b). See id. at 96, 
98. (vacating the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims regarding Item 303 and FAS 5, 
thereby providing the plaintiffs leave to replead their fraud claims under Section 10(b)). 
 39 Leidos, Inc., 137 S. Ct. at 1396 (granting certiorari to review SAIC). 
 40 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Leidos, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1395, dismissed, No. 16-581 (Oct. 
31, 2016). 
 41 See Madelyn La France et al., Securities Fraud, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1677, 1682–83 (2018) 
(“the Supreme Court was to hear a case as to whether or not Item 303 of SEC Regulation S-K creates 
an affirmative duty to disclose, such that failure to do so creates an actionable fraud claim under Sec-
tion 10(b), but the parties reached a last-minute settlement”). 
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regulations promulgated by the SEC.42 Under Section 10(b), the SEC promul-
gated Rule 10b-5, which provides, in relevant part, that it is unlawful to make 
any misstatement or omission of material fact in connection with the purchase 
or sale of a security.43 To establish a violation of Section 10(b), a plaintiff must 
show that the defendant misstated or omitted a material fact with scienter in 
connection with the transaction of a security, which the plaintiff relied upon to 
the plaintiff’s economic loss, causing injury to the plaintiff.44 The Second Cir-
cuit has elaborated that, in that context, a misstatement or omission is a state-
ment that misleads or conveys an incorrect impression of the factual circum-
stances.45 Thus, a wide range of conduct can lead to liability under Section 
10(b).46 In Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, the Supreme Court held that the materiality 
of a misstatement or omission depends on an assessment of the amount of the 
potential loss in light of the company’s operations discounted by the probabil-
ity of the event’s occurrence.47 
By comparison, Item 303 imposes specific disclosure obligations on a 
company in its corporate filings with respect to the management’s discussion 
and analysis of financial condition and results of operations.48 Item 303 re-
quires a company, in select corporate filings with the SEC, to articulate any 
                                                                                                                           
 42 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012); see Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203–04 (1976) (stating that Section 10(b) was intended by its drafters to 
serve as a blanket provision enabling the SEC to prohibit all manipulative acts in the securities ex-
changes); SEC v. Tambone, 597 F.3d 436, 442 (1st Cir. 2010) (noting that Section 10(b) confers upon 
the SEC the authority to issue regulations thereunder); see, e.g., Chadbourne & Parke, 571 U.S. at 
390 (confirming that the federal securities laws attempt to safeguard the exchanges from harmful 
conduct and thereby protect investors). 
 43 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018) (making it illegal “[t]o make any untrue statement of a material 
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading”). 
 44 Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157 (2008) (citing Dura 
Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005)). The Second Circuit requires plaintiffs to estab-
lish that the defendant: “(1) made misstatements or omissions of material fact, (2) with scienter, (3) in 
connection with the purchase or sale of securities, (4) upon which the plaintiff relied, and (5) that the 
plaintiff’s reliance was the proximate cause of its injury.” ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 
493 F.3d 87, 105 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 172 (2d Cir. 
2005)). 
 45 See, e.g., SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 862 (2d Cir. 1968) (stating that repre-
sentations made “in a manner reasonable calculated to influence the investing public” violate Section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 “if such assertions are false or misleading or are so incomplete as to mislead”). 
 46 See La France et al., supra note 41, at 1682 (noting that any type of advertised deceit can lead 
to liability under Section 10(b)). Examples of the wide-ranging conduct that can lead to a violation of 
Section 10(b) include emails, advertisements, and impersonations. Id. at 1682 n.31. 
 47 Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238 (1988) (quoting Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 
849) (“[M]ateriality ‘will depend at any given time upon a balancing of both the indicated probability 
that the event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the com-
pany activity.’”). 
 48 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2018). Corporate filings bound by Item 303 include Annual Reports on 
Form 10-K and Quarterly Reports on Form 10-Q. SAIC, 818 F.3d at 94 (quoting Stratte-McClure, 776 
F.3d at 101). 
II.-54 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:E. Supp. 
trends or uncertainties known to company management which have or are rea-
sonably expected to have a material effect on the company’s financial perfor-
mance.49 In an interpretative release, the SEC clarified that the duty to disclose 
under Item 303 arises where management is aware of the trend or uncertainty 
and reasonably expects it to have a material effect on the company’s financial 
stability.50 Where such a trend or uncertainty is known, the SEC has instructed 
management to make two inquiries.51 First, management must determine if the 
known trend or uncertainty is likely to transpire.52 If it is not reasonably likely, 
no disclosure is required.53 Second, if management cannot reach such a con-
clusion, it must objectively assess the implications of the known trend or un-
certainty, assuming it will transpire, and disclose the trend or uncertainty if 
management establishes that an adverse impact on the company’s financial 
stability is reasonably likely.54 
Given the disclosure obligations imposed by Item 303, courts have grap-
pled with the question of whether Item 303 creates a duty to disclose that, if 
violated, can establish a fraud claim under Section 10(b) of the Exchange 
Act.55 In Oran v. Stafford, then-Judge Samuel Alito, writing for the Third Cir-
cuit, held that a violation of Item 303’s duty to disclose does not inevitably 
lead to liability under Section 10(b).56 Relying on Oran, the Ninth Circuit con-
cluded in In re NVIDIA Corp. Securities Litigation that a violation of Item 
                                                                                                                           
 49 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii) (obligating SEC filers, in a section entitled management’s discus-
sion and analysis of financial condition and results of operations, to “[d]escribe any known trends or 
uncertainties that have had or that the registrant reasonably expects will have a material favorable or 
unfavorable impact on net sales or revenues or income from continuing operations”). 
 50 Certain Investment Company Disclosures, 54 Fed. Reg. at 22,429 (providing that the duty to 
disclose “exists where a trend, demand, commitment, event or uncertainty is both presently known to 
management and reasonably likely to have material effects on the registrant’s financial condition or re-
sults of operation”). 
 51 Id. at 22,430. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. In the second step of the inquiry, management “must evaluate objectively the consequences 
of the known trend, demand, commitment, event or uncertainty, on the assumption that it will come to 
fruition. Disclosure is then required unless management determines that a material effect on the regis-
trant’s financial condition or results of operations is not reasonably likely to occur.” Id. In a footnote, 
the SEC specifies that this standard of disclosure governing Item 303 disclosure—reasonably likely to 
have a material effect—is different from the “probability/magnitude test for materiality . . . in Basic, 
Inc. v. Levinson, [which] is inapposite to Item 303 disclosure.” Id. at 22,430 n.27. 
 55 Compare Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 102 (concluding that a violation of the duty to disclose 
under 303 can establish Section 10(b) liability), with In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d at 1056 
(concluding that a violation of Item 303’s duty to disclose does not establish liability under Section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5). 
 56 Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 288 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that a violation of the duty to dis-
close imposed by Item 303 does not “automatically” establish liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5). 
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303’s duty to disclose does not establish liability under Section 10(b).57 In con-
trast, in SAIC and Stratte-McClure, the Second Circuit, also relying on Oran, 
concluded that, under some circumstances, violations of Item 303’s duty to 
disclose can establish liability under Section 10(b).58 
II. SAIC’S LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND CONTEXT 
The Second Circuit’s decision in Indiana Public Retirement Systems v. 
SAIC, Inc. cements its rift with the Ninth Circuit over whether Item 303 creates 
a duty to disclose that, if violated, can constitute a violation of Section 10(b).59 
The Ninth Circuit has held that Item 303 does not create an affirmative duty to 
disclose that can establish a Section 10(b) securities fraud claim.60 The Second 
Circuit has reached the opposite conclusion.61 Despite their opposite conclu-
sions, both circuits relied on the Third Circuit’s Oran v. Stafford to reach their 
conclusions.62 The split between the Second and Ninth Circuits is significant 
because those circuits hear more federal securities law cases than the rest of the 
circuits combined.63 The divergence causes confusion for other circuits, lower 
courts, securities lawyers, and corporate filers; therefore clarity is needed.64 
                                                                                                                           
 57 See In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d at 1056 (relying on Oran to hold that Item 303 
does not create a duty to disclose for purposes of establishing a violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5). 
 58 See Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 103–04 (reading Oran to be consistent with its conclusion 
that violations of Item 303’s duty to disclose can, under some circumstances, violate Section 10(b)). 
To date, however, only the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits have directly addressed the issue. Id.; In 
re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d at 1056; Oran, 226 F.3d at 288; see Petition for Writ of Certio-
rari, supra note 40, at 2 (arguing that the Second Circuit’s holding in SAIC established a 2–1 circuit 
split between the circuits.). 
 59 See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 60 Cohen v. NVIDIA Corp. (In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig.), 768 F.3d 1046, 1056 (9th Cir. 
2014). 
 61 See Ind. Pub. Ret. Sys. v. SAIC, Inc., 818 F.3d 85, 94 n.7 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing Stratte-
McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 102 (2d Cir. 2015)) (reaffirming the court’s earlier conclu-
sion that a violation of Item 303’s duty to disclose can be actionable under Section 10(b)). 
 62 Compare Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 103–04 (interpreting Oran as compatible with the con-
clusion that a violation of Item 303’s disclosure requirements can violate Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5 when the omission is both material under Basic, Inc. v. Levinson and the plaintiff has established the 
remaining elements of the cause of action), with In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d at 1054–56 
(reading Oran as supporting the conclusion that the duty to disclose imposed by Item 303 does not 
support a claim under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5). 
 63 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 40, at 1–2. See generally STANFORD LAW SCH., 
Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, http://securities.stanford.edu/list-mode.html%22 
[https://perma.cc/A5FU-KGUZ] (highlighting, through a database of class action securities lawsuits 
filed in the United States, that the Ninth and Second Circuits hear the majority of cases dealing with 
securities issues). 
 64 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 40, at 10, 17–18 (noting that the Second and Ninth 
Circuits’ diverging standards have generated problems of forum shopping and led to varying out-
comes under what are intended to be uniform federal securities statutes); see Stratte-McClure, 776 
F.3d at 102 (finding that failure to satisfy Item 303’s disclosure requirements can establish Section 
II.-56 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:E. Supp. 
Section A of this Part discusses the Third Circuit’s Oran decision, which 
the Second and Ninth Circuits relied upon in reaching their conclusions.65 Sec-
tion B provides an overview of the Second Circuit’s reasoning in SAIC, and 
that court’s conclusion that Item 303 creates an affirmative duty to disclose for 
purposes of a Section 10(b) claim.66 Section C details the Ninth Circuit’s hold-
ing in Cohen v. NVIDIA Corp. (In re NVIDIA Corp. Securities Litigation) that 
a violation of the duty to disclose imposed by Item 303 does not constitute a 
violation of Section 10(b), and the underlying rationale of that decision.67 
A. The Third Circuit Leaves Unanswered the Question of Section 10(b) 
Liability for a Violation of Item 303 
In Oran, the Third Circuit held that a violation of Item 303’s duty to dis-
close does not necessarily constitute a violation of Section 10(b).68 In so con-
cluding, the court considered the standard applicable to Item 303 disclosure 
and its inconsistency with the standard governing Section 10(b) fraud ac-
tions.69 The court reasoned that the two standards differ considerably, and 
therefore a violation of Item 303’s disclosure requirements does not automati-
cally establish liability under Section 10(b).70 Accordingly, the court concluded 
that a violation of the disclosure requirements of Item 303 is not always a ma-
terial omission under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.71 Thus, the Third Circuit 
did not decide whether a failure to disclose as required by Item 303 could, un-
der some circumstances, establish liability under Section 10(b).72 
                                                                                                                           
10(b) liability); In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d at 1056 (concluding that failure to satisfy 
Item 303’s disclosure requirements does not establish liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5). 
 65 See infra notes 68–72 and accompanying text. 
 66 See infra notes 73–80 and accompanying text. 
 67 See infra notes 81–85 and accompanying text. 
 68 Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 288 (3d Cir. 2000). In Oran, stockholders in American Home 
Products Corporation (“AHP”), brought suit against AHP and several officers and directors, alleging 
that AHP made material omissions and misrepresentations regarding the safety of two weight-loss 
drugs in light of accounts of significant side effects. Id. at 279. The United States District Court for 
the District of New Jersey granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, and the plaintiffs appealed. Id. at 
281. The plaintiffs raised four arguments on appeal, one of which was that AHP violated Item 303, 
which could lead to liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Id. 
 69 See id. at 287 (examining the disclosure required by Item 303 and comparing it to the disclo-
sure obligations required to pursue a securities action under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5). 
 70 See id. at 288 (explaining that the duty to disclose under Item 303 is much broader than the 
duty to disclose under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5). For a more detailed explanation of the differ-
ences between the two standards, see infra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 71 Oran, 226 F.3d at 288. 
 72 See id. (holding that a violation of Item 303 is not “automatically” a violation of Section 
10(b)); see also Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 103 (asserting that Oran insinuated, but did not decide, 
that under some circumstances a violation of Item 303 could lead to liability under Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5); Lauren M. Mastronardi, Note, Shining the Light a Little Brighter: Should Item 303 Serve 
as a Basis for Liability Under Rule 10b-5?, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 335, 362 (2016) (arguing that alt-
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B. The Second Circuit’s Relies on Circuit Precedent in Deciding that an 
Item 303 Violation Can Constitute a Violation of Section 10(b) 
In SAIC, the Second Circuit built upon its earlier decision in Stratte-
McClure v. Morgan Stanley, recognizing that the violation of Item 303 can, 
under certain circumstances, establish liability under Section 10(b).73 In Strat-
te-McClure, the Second Circuit had held that Item 303 creates an affirmative 
duty to disclose that, if violated, can constitute a violation of the federal securi-
ties laws.74 In so holding, the court relied on earlier courts that had recognized 
that the affirmative duty to disclose required to plead a Section 10(b) claim can 
flow from regulations mandating such disclosure.75 The Second Circuit agreed 
with those courts, reasoning that omitting information required by a mandatory 
corporate filing could render the filing misleading in violation of Section 
10(b).76 Item 303’s mandatory disclosures provide shareholders with insight 
into a company’s financial performance, therefore the Second Circuit noted 
that the reasonable investor would assume that the lack of an Item 303 disclo-
sure would denote that no known trends or uncertainties existed.77 Since the 
court reasoned that the omission of known trends and uncertainties in violation 
of Item 303 can render the statement misleading, it concluded that Item 303 
                                                                                                                           
hough Oran identified the different standards of disclosure under Item 303 and Rule 10b-5, it did not 
describe the two standards as mutually exclusive). 
 73 SAIC, 818 F.3d at 94 n.7. The Second Circuit recognized that a violation of Item 303 can estab-
lish liability under Section 10(b) by instructing the lower court to allow the plaintiffs to amend their 
Item 303 claims. See id. at 98 (vacating the district court’s judgment regarding the Item 303 and FAS 
5 claims and remanding “for further proceedings consistent with this opinion”). 
 74 Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 101. The controversy in Stratte-McClure arose out of Morgan 
Stanley’s losses resulting from the subprime mortgage crisis. Id. at 96. The plaintiffs, Morgan Stanley 
shareholders, initiated a class action lawsuit under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act. Id. 
The plaintiffs claimed that Morgan Stanley and various officers and ex-officers made unlawful mis-
statements and omissions of material facts in an attempt to suppress Morgan Stanley’s losses from the 
crisis, causing significant financial injury to shareholders. Id. 
 75 Id. at 102 (noting that prior decisions in the Second Circuit and other circuits had established 
that the regulations or statutes calling for disclosure could create a duty to disclose for purposes of 
Section 10(b)); see, e.g., Gallagher v. Abbott Labs., 269 F.3d 806, 808 (7th Cir. 2001) (“We do not 
have a system of continuous disclosure. Instead firms are entitled to keep silent (about good news as 
well as bad news) unless positive law creates a duty to disclose.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 76 Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 102 (reasoning that it is proper for statutes or regulations requir-
ing disclosure to establish Section 10(b)’s duty to disclose because omitting information in violation 
of such statutes or regulations would make the statement misleading in violation of Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5); see 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018) (making unlawful the misstatement or omission of a 
material fact that, under the circumstances, were necessary to make the larger statements not mislead-
ing). 
 77 Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 102 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii) (2018)) (noting that “a 
reasonable investor would interpret the absence of an Item 303 disclosure to imply the nonexistence of 
‘known trends or uncertainties . . . that the registrant reasonably expects will have a material . . . unfa-
vorable impact on . . . revenues or income from continuing operations”). 
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imposes a duty to disclose that, if violated, can establish liability under Section 
10(b).78 
The Second Circuit, however, recognized that a violation of the Item 303 
disclosure requirement does not per se establish liability under Section 10(b) 
because Rule 10b-5 makes only material violations actionable under the stat-
ute.79 Thus, in Stratte-McClure, the Second Circuit concluded that a violation 
of the duty to disclose imposed by Item 303 can constitute a violation of Sec-
tion 10(b) only if the omitted information satisfies the materiality standard ar-
ticulated by the Supreme Court in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson.80 
C. The Ninth Circuit Concludes a Violation of Item 303’s Duty to Disclose 
Does Not Constitute a Violation of Section 10(b) 
In contrast to the Second Circuit’s conclusion, in In re NVIDIA Corp. Se-
curities Litigation the Ninth Circuit held that Item 303 does not create a duty 
to disclose that is actionable under Section 10(b).81 Relying on the reasoning of 
the Third Circuit’s Oran opinion, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Item 303’s 
                                                                                                                           
 78 See id. (“[O]mitting an item required to be disclosed [by Item 303] can render that financial 
statement misleading . . . . It follows that Item 303 imposes the type of duty to speak that can, in ap-
propriate cases, give rise to liability under Section 10(b).”). 
 79 See id. (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5) (noting that failing to meet the disclosure obligations of 
Item 303 alone is insufficient to satisfy the Section 10(b) cause of action because Rule 10b-5 makes 
only ‘material’ omissions actionable.”). In Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, the Supreme Court concluded that a 
forward-looking statement is determined to be material by weighing the likelihood that the stated 
event will happen and the projected scale of the stated event given the entirety of the company’s be-
havior. 485 U.S. 224, 238 (1988) (quoting SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 
1968)) (“[M]ateriality ‘will depend at any given time upon a balancing of both the indicated probabil-
ity that the event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the 
company activity.’”). 
 80 Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 103. To determine whether information omitted in violation of 
Item 303 satisfies the Basic materiality standard, a plaintiff must allege in the first instance that the 
defendant omitted information in violation of Item 303, thus demonstrating that the defendant had a 
duty to disclose. Id. Second, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the information was material under the 
Basic standard, due to the fact that Rule “10b-5 only makes unlawful an omission of ‘material infor-
mation’ that is ‘necessary to make . . . statements made,’ . . . ‘not misleading.’” Id. (quoting Matrixx 
Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 44 (2011)). Lastly, as is required for all Section 10(b) 
claims, a plaintiff must also demonstrate “scienter, a ‘connection between the . . . omission and the 
purchase or sale of a security,’ reliance on the omission, and an economic loss caused by that reli-
ance.” Id. (quoting Levitt v. J.P. Morgan Sec., Inc., 710 F.3d 454, 465 (2d Cir. 2013)). 
 81 In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d at 1056. In In re NVIDIA Corp. Securities Litigation, 
the plaintiffs, investors in NVIDIA Corp., a public semiconductor company, brought suit against 
NVIDIA, alleging violations of the federal securities laws. Id. at 1048. In the spring of 2008, NVIDIA 
made disclosure to investors about defects in two of NVIDIA’s products. Id. Shortly thereafter, 
NVIDIA disclosed to shareholders that it would be assuming a roughly $200 million charge in order 
to cover the defects’ associated costs. Id. In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that NVIDIA was 
aware it would be liable for the defects well in advance of its disclosures, and that NVIDIA should 
have disclosed the defects to shareholders in November 2007. Id. Given the lack of earlier disclosure, 
the plaintiffs claimed NVIDIA’s statements to investors regarding its financial condition were mis-
leading in violation of Section 10(b). Id. 
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disclosure obligations differ significantly from the materiality standard laid out 
in Basic.82 The Ninth Circuit noted that the SEC expounded on this point, stat-
ing in an interpretative release that Basic’s standard is unsuitable for disclosure 
under Item 303.83 Thus, because the two standards—materiality under Rule 
10b-5 and the two-step inquiry under Item 303—are substantially different, the 
Ninth Circuit held that a violation of Item 303’s disclosure requirements does 
not demonstrate that the disclosure is required under Section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5.84 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit held that Item 303 does not establish 
a duty to disclose for purposes of Section 10(b).85 
III. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S CORRECT CONCLUSION THAT A VIOLATION OF 
ITEM 303’S DUTY TO DISCLOSE CAN VIOLATE SECTION 10(B) 
In Indiana Public Retirement System v. SAIC, Inc., the Second Circuit, 
building off its earlier decision in Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, correctly 
recognized that a violation of Item 303’s disclosure requirements can establish 
liability under Section 10(b).86 Further, the Second Circuit correctly limited 
                                                                                                                           
 82 Id. at 1054–55 (citing Oran, 226 F.3d at 288). Item 303 requires management to “[d]escribe [in 
corporate filings] any known trends or uncertainties that have had or that the registrant reasonably 
expects will have a material . . . impact on net sales or revenues or income from continuing opera-
tions.” 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii). In an interpretive release, the SEC further clarified this require-
ment by obligating management to perform a two-step analysis asking first if “the known trend, de-
mand, commitment, event or uncertainty” is likely to occur. Certain Investment Company Disclo-
sures, 54 Fed. Reg. 22,427, 22,430 (May 18, 1989). Disclosure is not required “[i]f management de-
termines that it is not reasonably likely to occur.” Id. If management cannot make that determination, 
the second step requires management to assume the uncertainty will occur and “evaluate objectively 
the consequences” of such occurrence. Id. If “management determines that a material effect on the 
registrant’s financial condition or results of operations is not reasonably likely to occur” disclosure is 
not required. Id. By contrast, the materiality of forward-looking statements depends “upon a balancing 
of both the indicated probability that the event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event in 
light of the totality of the company activity.” Basic, 485 U.S. at 238 (quoting Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 
401 F.2d at 849). Thus, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the disclosure required under Item 303 is much 
broader in scope than the disclosure required under the Supreme Court’s materiality standard in Basic. In 
re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d at 1055. 
 83 In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d at 1055 (pointing to the SEC’s instruction that the 
standard of materiality in Basic is not the standard of disclosure applicable to Item 303); see Certain 
Investment Company Disclosures, 54 Fed. Reg. at 22,430 n.27 (“[Item 303] mandates disclosure of 
specified forward-looking information, and specifies its own standard for disclosure—i.e., reasonably 
likely to have a material effect. This specific standard governs the circumstances in which Item 303 
requires disclosure. The [Basic materiality test] . . . is inapposite to Item 303 disclosure.”). 
 84 In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d at 1055 (citing Oran, 226 F.3d at 288) (reasoning that 
the two standards of disclosure are substantially different, therefore the violation of Item 303 does not 
establish a violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5). 
 85 Id. at 1056 (holding that the violation of Item 303’s duty to disclose does not establish a viola-
tion of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5). 
 86 See Ind. Pub. Ret. Sys. v. SAIC, Inc., 818 F.3d 85, 94 n.7 (2d Cir. 2016) (reaffirming its hold-
ing in Stratte-McClure); Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 103 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding 
that failure to disclose under Item 303 can sometimes violate Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5). 
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that holding to cases where the omitted information satisfies the Supreme 
Court’s Basic, Inc. v. Levinson materiality standard.87 
The Supreme Court has provided that, without a positive disclosure obli-
gation, remaining silent does not violate Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.88 The 
requisite duty to disclose arises from, among other sources, statutes or regula-
tions calling for such disclosures.89 As the Second Circuit properly noted, Item 
303, as a regulation promulgated by the SEC, imposes upon SEC registrants 
such an affirmative duty to disclose.90 Under Item 303, management is obligat-
ed to disclose a trend or uncertainty of which it is aware and that it expects will 
materially affect the company’s operations.91 Given this affirmative obligation, 
the Second Circuit properly reasoned that a violation of Item 303’s duty to dis-
close can, under certain circumstances, constitute a violation of Section 
10(b).92 Stated plainly, the Second Circuit has persuasively reasoned, if the 
                                                                                                                           
 87 See SAIC, 818 F.3d at 94 n.7 (reaffirming its holding in Stratte-McClure that failing to make a 
disclosure required by Item 303 can constitute a violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 if the omit-
ted information is material under Basic and the cause of action’s remaining elements are established). 
 88 See, e.g., Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1988) (“Silence, absent a duty to 
disclose, is not misleading under Rule 10b-5.”). The disclosure regime mandated by the federal securi-
ties laws is not predicated upon continuous disclosure, but rather upon disclosure in light of a duty 
obligating such disclosures. See Gallagher v. Abbott Labs., 269 F.3d 806, 808 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting 
that corporate filers are permitted not to make any disclosure unless affirmatively required to do so by 
law). 
 89 See Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 101 (quoting Glazer v. Formica Corp., 964 F.2d 149, 157 (2d 
Cir.1992)) (stating that the duty to disclose arises from, among other affirmative obligations, a “‘stat-
ute or regulation requiring disclosure,’ or a corporate statement that would otherwise be ‘inaccurate, 
incomplete, or misleading’”). 
 90 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii) (2018) (requiring companies to “[d]escribe any known trends or 
uncertainties that have had or that the registrant reasonably expects will have a material favorable or 
unfavorable impact on net sales or revenues or income from continuing operations”); see SAIC, 818 
F.3d at 94 & n.7 (explaining the obligations imposed by Item 303); Donald C. Langevoort & G. Mitu 
Gulati, The Muddled Duty to Disclose Under Rule 10b-5, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1639, 1651 (2004) (stat-
ing that a duty to disclose exists where an omission would have the possibility to mislead and noting 
that there are certain trends or uncertainties about which shareholders would want to be informed). 
 91 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii). This duty to disclose is not unlimited, and is restricted to only 
those “trends or uncertainties” actually known to management. See SAIC, 818 F.3d at 95 (stating that 
Item 303 requires the disclosure of only those trends or uncertainties about which management is 
aware at the time of filing with the SEC). Under Item 303, that management should have been aware 
of a trend or uncertainty does not suffice. Id. In an interpretive release, the SEC has confirmed both 
that a duty to disclose exists and that it is limited to information actually known to management. See 
Certain Investment Company Disclosures, 54 Fed. Reg. at 22,429 (clarifying that the duty to disclose 
imposed by Item 303 extends to only those trends or uncertainties “presently known to management”). 
 92 See Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 102 (noting that Item 303’s duty to disclose can lead to liabil-
ity under Section 10(b) in certain circumstances). But see Cohen v. NVIDIA Corp. (In re NVIDIA 
Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d 1046, 1056 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that Section 10(b) liability cannot be 
established by a violation of Item 303’s duty to disclose). 
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information omitted in violation of Item 303 is material under Basic, Section 
10(b) is violated.93 
The federal securities laws seek both to regulate securities exchanges and 
to protect investors from market abuse and unfair practices.94 Recognizing 
Item 303 as a duty to disclose for purposes of Section 10(b) liability will pro-
vide investor protection by requiring SEC registrants to disclose to investors 
those material trends or uncertainties known to management.95 Item 303 dis-
closures provide investors the opportunity to assess the reporting company 
from the perspective of management.96 In enabling investors to make informed 
investment decisions, this scheme achieves investor protection and thereby 
furthers Congress’s intent in enacting the federal securities laws.97 
                                                                                                                           
 93 See Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 103 (concluding that a violation of Item 303’s duty to dis-
close can only establish liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 if the information is material 
under the Basic standard). A plaintiff must also sufficiently plead the other elements of the Section 
10(b) cause of action. Id. at 104. 
 94 See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 728 (1975) (highlighting that 
the Exchange Act is “an Act to provide for the regulation of securities exchanges and of over-the-
counter markets operating in interstate and foreign commerce and through the mails, to prevent ineq-
uitable and unfair practices on such exchanges and markets, and for other purposes”) (internal quota-
tion omitted); see also Mastronardi, supra note 72, at 339 (“After the crash, Congress determined that 
abuses in the securities markets, such as fraud and deliberate manipulation of stock prices, were par-
tially to blame. Thus, one of Congress’s main priorities [in enacting the federal securities laws] was to 
find a way to protect vulnerable investors.”). 
 95 See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975) (identifying investor pro-
tection and the regulation of the securities exchanges to reduce abusive behaviors as the underlying 
purposes of the federal securities laws); see also Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 102 (providing that 
inadequate disclosure under Item 303 can establish liability under Section 10(b) if the omitted infor-
mation is material under Basic). Failure to adequately disclose information under Item 303 will risk 
liability under Section 10(b). See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012) 
(codifying the Exchange Act’s antifraud provision). 
 96 Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 102 (stating that information disclosed pursuant to Item 303 “give 
investors an opportunity to look at the registrant through the eyes of management”) (quoting Certain 
Investment Company Disclosures, 54 Fed. Reg. at 22,436). 
 97 See Mastronardi, supra note 72, at 364 (noting that potential Section 10(b) liability incentivizes 
companies to comply with Item 303’s disclosure requirements, thereby providing investors with 
meaningful information). The legislative history of the Exchange Act confirms that investor protection 
was one of Congress’s priorities. H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 2, 5 (1934) (“[T]his bill seeks to regulate 
the stock exchanges and the relationships of the investing public to corporations which invite public 
investment by listing on such exchanges . . . it [is] a condition of the very stability of . . . society that 
its rules of law and of business practice recognize and protect that ordinary citizen’s dependent posi-
tion.”). In addition to achieving investor protection, the mandatory disclosure regime also increases 
market efficiency by requiring corporate filers to make available to the market larger volumes of 
truthful information about the state of their businesses. Mastronardi, supra note 72, at 343. Requiring 
public companies to disclose—fully and accurately—salient information about the securities they 
offer will enable individual investors to value an investment opportunity and “fend for themselves.” 
See Fan, supra note 22, at 598–99 (quoting Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm 
in a World of Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 12) (articulating the underlying rationale of the 
federal securities laws’ mandatory disclosure regime). 
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Opponents of this scheme argue that such an application would engulf in-
vestors with so much information that they would be unable to comprehend or 
identify critical information, thereby nullifying the efficacy of the disclosure 
obligation.98 Contrary to that argument, the scheme would not inundate inves-
tors with information, because only material trends or uncertainties would need 
to be disclosed.99 Moreover, Item 303 requires disclosure of only those unfa-
vorable trends or uncertainties actually known to management, who are unlike-
ly to speculate unnecessarily about such trends or uncertainties.100 Allowing 
Item 303’s affirmative duty to disclose to serve as the basis of a violation of 
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act achieves superior investor protection and 
furthers the aims of the federal securities laws.101 
The Ninth Circuit incorrectly concluded that an Item 303 violation can 
never constitute a violation of Section 10(b).102 Furthermore, its reliance on the 
Third Circuit’s Oran decision for that proposition was misplaced.103 The Ninth 
Circuit suggested that Oran stood for the proposition that a violation of Item 
303’s disclosure requirements can never constitute a violation of Section 
10(b).104 In actuality, Oran implicitly recognized that a violation of Item 303 
can, under certain circumstances, establish liability under Section 10(b).105 In-
                                                                                                                           
 98 See Mastronardi, supra note 72, at 364 (discussing one counterargument to permitting viola-
tions of Item 303 to constitute violations of Section 10(b)—that, in response to such liability, compa-
nies will inundate investors with disclosure); see also Michael Greenstone, Paul Oyer & Annette 
Vissing-Jorgensen, Mandated Disclosure, Stock Returns, and the 1964 Securities Acts Amendments, 
121 Q.J. ECON. 399, 404–05 (2006) (noting that mandatory disclosure regimes cause registrants to 
release an “inefficient[]” volume of information). 
 99 See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 44–45 (2011) (quoting 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.10b-5 (2018)) (explaining that Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 do not require the disclosure of all 
information, but rather only of material information that is required to render statements “in light of 
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading”); see also Mastronardi, supra note 
72, at 356 (describing Item 303’s “intrinsic safeguards” that will prevent investors from being inun-
dated with information). 
 100 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii); see Mastronardi, supra note 72, at 364 (noting that companies 
will not strive to provide more than the bare minimum of information required under Item 303). 
 101 See Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971) (inter-
preting Section 10(b) as an intent by Congress to prohibit all manner of deception in securities trans-
actions); see also Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the Inter-
national Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 941–42 (1998) (“One of the most 
cited and intuitive goals of the securities laws is the protection of investors . . . . Securities regulation, 
therefore, may play a role in forcing companies to provide information truthfully to investors.”). 
 102 See In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d at 1054 (holding that a violation of the duty to 
disclose imposed by Item 303 does not establish liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5). 
 103 See Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 103 (criticizing the Ninth Circuit for misinterpreting Oran). 
 104 See In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d at 1054–56 (relying on Oran to hold that a viola-
tion of the duty to disclose imposed by Item 303 cannot constitute a violation of Section 10(b)). But 
see Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 103 (critiquing the Ninth Circuit’s mischaracterization of Oran). 
 105 Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 288 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that the violation of the duty to 
disclose imposed by Item 303 does not “automatically” establish liability under Rule 10b-5). In Strat-
te-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, in concluding that Item 303 imposes a duty to disclose that can estab-
lish the basis of a violation of Section 10(b), the Second Circuit addressed its explicit disagreement 
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deed, subsequent courts have adopted this less restrictive interpretation of 
Oran.106 
Moreover, rendering a violation of Item 303 incapable of establishing a 
violation of Section 10(b) would frustrate the goals of the federal securities 
laws by exposing investors to a greater risk of abuse without any recourse in 
the law.107 Accordingly, other circuits and district courts should follow the 
Second Circuit’s approach, and recognize that a violation of the duty to dis-
close mandated by Item 303 can, under the correct circumstances, lead to lia-
bility under Section 10(b).108 
CONCLUSION 
In Indiana Public Retirement Systems v. SAIC, Inc., the Second Circuit 
expanded on its earlier decision in Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, and 
recognized that Item 303 creates a duty to disclose that, if violated, can consti-
tute a violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The 
Second Circuit correctly recognized that a violation of Item 303 can establish 
                                                                                                                           
with the Ninth Circuit. 776 F.3d at 103–04. The Second Circuit principally disagreed with the Ninth’s 
Circuit’s characterization of Oran. See id. at 103 (criticizing the Ninth Circuit for relying on Oran to 
hold that violations of Item 303 do not constitute violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5). The 
Second Circuit interpreted Oran as having left open the possibility that a violation of Item 303 could, 
under certain circumstances, establish liability under Section 10(b). Id. (“Contrary to the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s implication that Oran compels a conclusion that Item 303 violations are never actionable under 
10b-5, Oran actually suggested, without deciding, that in certain instances a violation of Item 303 
could give rise to a material 10b-5 omission.”). 
 106 See SEC v. Conaway, 698 F. Supp. 2d 771, 839 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (interpreting Oran as ex-
cluding from liability under 10(b) those violations of the Item 303 duty to disclose that are not materi-
al under Basic). Furthermore, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan 
reasoned that, under Oran, Item 303 liability under Section 10(b) could be restricted to those instances 
in which 1) disclosure is made as required by Item 303, 2) omitted information required by Item 303 
is material under Basic, and 3) the omitted information renders the disclosure misleading given the 
circumstances. Id. at 839 & n.57. The Eastern District of Michigan also noted that the independent 
showing required by Section 10(b) missing in Oran was that the alleged omissions in Oran were not 
material, hence defendant American Home Products Corp. had not made any material misstatement. 
Id. at 839 (emphasis added) (citing Oran, 226 F.3d at 288). Another court to adopt this more permis-
sive view of Oran is the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota. See Beaver Cty. 
Emps.’ Ret. Fund v. Tile Shop Holdings, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 3d 1035, 1047 (D. Minn. 2015) (viewing 
the Second Circuit’s reasoning in Stratte-McClure as persuasive and adopting a more relaxed view of 
Oran). See generally Matthew Ady, Living in a Material World: Does a Violation of Item 303 of Reg-
ulation S-K Satisfy the Materiality Element in a Rule 10b-5 Cause of Action?, 17 WAKE FOREST J. 
BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 401, 424–25 (2017) (discussing courts that have adopted a more permissive 
view of Oran). 
 107 See Ady, supra note 106, at 422–23 (“Stated plainly, the NVIDIA ruling effectively rendered 
Item 303 violations immune to Rule 10b-5. Stated even more plainly, if defendants could show that 
the omission was in violation of Item 303, then the omission could not qualify as material under Rule 
10b-5.”); Mastronardi, supra note 72, at 339 (citing investor protection as one of Congress’s main 
concerns in enacting the federal securities laws). 
 108 See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
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liability under Section 10(b) only when the allegedly omitted information sat-
isfies the material standard under the Supreme Court’s Basic, Inc. v. Levinson 
decision, and otherwise demonstrates the cause of action’s remaining elements. 
In so holding, the Second Circuit accurately construed the underlying statute 
and regulation, adhered to earlier jurisprudence, and furthered the aims of the 
federal securities laws. By contrast, the Ninth Circuit incorrectly reasoned, in 
Cohen v. NVIDIA Corp. (In re NVIDIA Corp. Securities Litigation), that an 
Item 303 violation cannot constitute a violation of Section 10(b). Despite the 
Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in SAIC, an eleventh-hour settlement be-
tween the parties precluded the Supreme Court from resolving the split. Alt-
hough future reviewing courts should follow the Second Circuit’s approach, 
pending a resolution of the issue by the Supreme Court, confusion remains. 
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